This paper investigates jumps and cojumps in European financial markets employing more than six years of tick by tick data on stock index, currency and interest rate futures. We use a new jump detection measure built upon a methodology proposed by Andersen et al. (2007c) and Lee and Mykland (2008) . Our results show that scheduled US macroeconomic announcements cause significant jumps on all asset classes. European equity markets are found to be more responsive to the US fundamentals than currency and interest rate futures.
Introduction
The idea that macroeconomic news affect financial markets is by now well established. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) , for example, argue that macroeconomic variables are excellent candidates for extra market risk factors. More recent papers have focused on the information arrival and price discovery process using high frequency intraday data [e.g., Andersen et al. (2003 , Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006) ]. The findings in those papers suggest that macroeconomic news announcements may be responsible for generating jumps and cojumps in financial markets.
1 Jumps are defined as sudden and large discontinuities in pricing process of financial markets. Cojumps arise when jumps occur contemporaneously in multiple markets. Understanding the characterization and causes of jump is central to asset pricing and financial management [see Piazzesi (2005) , Lee and Mykland (2008) , and
Tauchen and Zhou (2005)]. It is also important to consider the extent to which jumps occur simultaneously across different asset classes, such as stock index, interest rate and currency market futures. Beine et al. (2009) argues that investors and speculators who follow real time trading strategies are interested in high-frequency interrelations of asset markets to optimally time their portfolio rebalancing. Therefore, common sources of n ews an d rel ati on of di ff eren t asset cl asses to f un dam en tal s h el p us understand jump characteristics across markets [Lahaye et al. (2011) ].
The objective of this paper is to investigate the intraday jumps and cojumps in European financial markets around key US macroeconomic news announcements. We use very high frequency data on stock index futures, i.e., Euro Stoxx50, CAC40 and DAX30 as well as the 3-month Euribor and EUR/USD futures.
We utilize the non-parametric statistic of Lee and Mykland (2008) to detect jumps on high frequency data spanning more than six years. The Lee-Mykland technique to identify intraday jumps allows us to study the role of scheduled macroeconomic announcements in creating jumps. Following Lahaye et al. (2011) , we also use this statistic to investigate multivariate issues and test whether macro announcements cause cojumps across multiple financial markets. Even though European equity markets are found to be the more sensitive to US fundamentals, our results show that scheduled US macroeconomic announcements cause significant jumps on all asset classes. Our findings also indicate a strong correlation between the type of the news and the orientation of the jumps. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of jumps have considerably increased in European markets since the start of the global credit crisis in 2007. We also find a strong evidence of cojumps caused by the US macro surprises across European stock index futures. Our analysis suggests that interdependence among European equity markets has increased since the global recession in 2007.
The recent literature on the relationship between economic fundamentals and financial markets can be divided into two main categories. The first strand of literature has analyzed the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on intraday returns and volatilities in financial markets. 2 The second thread has linked scheduled macro announcements to jumps and cojumps in financial markets. For example, Huang (2007) estimates daily jumps with bi-power variation on 10 years of S&P 500 and U.S. T-bonds data. By analysing conditional distributions of jumps and regressing continuous and jump components on measures of disagreement and uncertainty concerning future macroeconomic states, Huang (2007) finds a major role for payroll news and a relatively more responsive bond market. Dungey et al. (2008) focuses on the US treasury market, and estimates jumps and cojumps across the term structure with bi-power variation. Their results show that macroeconomic announcements are strongly associated with the jumps and cojumps in the term structure. Bollerslev et al. (2008) using a newly developed test statistic find strong evidence for many modest-sized, yet highly significant cojumps that simply pass through standard jump detection statistics when applied on a stock-by-stock basis. Han (2008) analyzes the intraday effects of the US and the EMU macroeconomic shocks on both the conditional means and the conditional variances of the high frequency Dollar-Euro returns. The author finds that macroeconomic shocks may have discernible effects on exchange rates when examined at the high frequency level with the disappearance of the effects at lower frequency levels due to their being drowned in subsequent fluctuations of exchange rates. Jiang et al. (2009) examines jumps in the U.S. Treasury bond prices. They show that while jumps occur mostly at pre-scheduled macroeconomic announcement times, announcement surprises have limited power in explaining bond price jumps. They also find that pre-announcement liquidity shocks, such as changes in the bid-ask spread and market depth, have significant predictive power for jumps. Dungey and Hvozdyk (2012) examine cojumping behavior of spot and futures prices in high frequency US Treasury data.
They find that cojumping occurs most frequently at shorter maturities and higher sampling frequencies and that the probability of cojumping is particularly affected by news surprises in non-farm payrolls, consumer price index (CPI), gross domestic product (GDP) and retail sales. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The data are described in section two.
The methodology is presented in section three. Section four describes the empirical findings and a summary and conclusions follow in section five.
3 Many earlier studies, e.g., Huang (2007) , have relied on daily or lower frequency data to investigate the relation between economic fundamentals and jumps and cojumps in financial markets. with the nearest six delivery months being consecutive calendar months. They are quoted as 100 minus the 3-month rate of interest.
Data

Financial markets data
Insert Table 1 about here To limit the detection of spurious jumps due to illiquid market, we filter out midquote prices where the bid-ask spread exceeds 4 ticks. We then follow the same procedure as Lee and Mykland (2008) and sample the mid-quote prices at fixed time intervals of 5 minutes in order to limit the market microstructure noise. The descriptive statistics of 5-minute returns are shown in Table 2 .
Insert 
Methodology
Our methodology for detecting the jumps and cojumps in European stock index, currency and interest rates futures around US macro-economic releases is based largely on the model proposed by Lee and Mykland (2008) . The idea behind the model is as follows:
Let ( ) be a logarithmic asset price at time t. Consider the continuous time jump diffusion process defined by the following equation:
where ( ) is a continuous and locally bounded variation process, ( ) is a strictly positive stochastic volatility process with a sample path that is right continuous and has well defined limits, ( ) is a standard Brownian motion, and ( ) is a counting process with intensity ( ) [ ( ) =1]= ( ) and ( ) ( ) ) is the size of the particular jump. The quadratic variation for the cumulative process ( ) ( ) (0), and [ ] , is the integrated volatility of the continuous sample path component plus the sum of the ( ) squared jumps that occurred between time 0 and time . 4 The selection of the US macro indicators is based on the availability of data and their occurrence during the European markets' trading hours. 5 Thereafter, all times are given in Central European Time (CET).
The intuition behind the jump test proposed by Andersen et al. (2007c) and Lee and Mykland (2008) is simple and straightforward. In the absence of jumps, instantaneous returns are increments of Brownian motion. Standardized returns that are too large to plausibly come from a standard Brownian motion must reflect jumps. More formally, let us assume that we have days of 1/ equally spaced intraday returns and denote the i-t h r e t u r n o f d a y by ( ) ( + ( 1) ), where = 1, … , . Andersen et al. (2007c) and Lee and Mykland (2008) propose the following test statistic for jumps in ;
One must estimate the unobserved volatility, , with a robust-to-jump estimator.
Barnsdorff- Shephard (2004, 2006a) show that under weak conditions, realized bi-power variation (RBV) converges to integrated volatility under the model described by equation (1).
where ( ) (4) with
0.79788
Consequently, and Lee and Mykland (2008) propose to estimate as the average of the RBV computed over a local window K observations preceding period t, i. 
The realised bi-power variation on a window K is estimated as
Provided that the window size ( ) where 1 < 0.5 and that the time between two observations = max } is small, the null hypothesis of no jump at time is rejected at 1% significant level if
n is the number of observations, = , = ( ) and = . We rely on Lee-Mykland (2008) test to detect jumps as it is more accurate and precise than the Barnsdorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) test. LeeMykland (2008) demonstrates that the likelihood of misclassification of jumps becomes negligible using high frequency data. Table 3 provides an overall view of the identified jumps. The second panel in Table 3 [Jump day frequency] shows that number of days associated with jumps vary across asset classes. In accordance with the results reported by Lahaye et al. (2011) One explanation of such phenomena for exchange rate, as suggested by Lahaye et al. (2011) is that they are subject to news from two countries, not just one, and probably because they experience more idiosyncratic liquidity shocks during slow trading in the 24-hour markets. The idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and other news items that are not part of our sample may also explain the relatively more frequent and larger jumps in 3-months Euribor futures. 6 Among the European stock indices, the French market exhibits highest number of jump days indicating higher volatility, confirming the findings of Harju and Hussain (2011) . We now turn our attention to asymmetry in jumps frequency. The statistics reported in panel 4 and 5 of Table 3 suggest that there are about equal number of positive and negative jumps in interest rate and currency future markets. However, there are more negative jumps in European stock index futures than positive jumps, indicating asymmetry in stock markets. The last panel in Table 3 shows that 63% of all jumps in FDAX are negative, while the similar figure for the FCE and FESX is 57% and 59%, respectively. 7 Lahaye et al. (2011) show that equity markets tend to show more 6 For example, Baglioni and Monticini (2010) show that the implicit hourly interest rate in the euro area money market jumped by more than ten times at the outset of sub-prime financial turmoil in August 2010. Authors argue that this evidence may be attributed to an increase of the liquidity premium and of the cost of collateral. 7 The total numbers of surprises associated with jumps are 254. Out of which, 22 are zero, 125 are negative and 107 are positive surprises. This may also be one of the plausible reasons for observed asymmetry in stock indices futures as the surprises were more often negative than positive during our negative jumps than the Forex market. However, they find that the disparity between positive and negative jumps on equity markets is not statistically significant.
Empirical results
Descriptive Statistics of Jumps
Insert table 3 about here
US Macroeconomic announcements and associated Jumps in European markets.
To measure the impacts of scheduled US macroeconomic events on European stock indices, interest rate and currency futures; we perform the Lee-Mykland (2008) Harju and Hussain (2011) showing that the U.S unemployment numbers have a significant impact across
European equity markets.
sample period. Therefore, it seems intuitive that European stock indices future experienced more negative jumps. 8 As noted earlier that almost all US macroeconomic announcements are made either at 14:30 or 16:00 CET, we carry out the test between 13:00 and 22:00 CET. Another important observation is that there are differences in markets' response to different types of announcements. These results are not surprising given the earlier results that asset classes respond differently to different announcements. Huang (2007), for example, found that the US fixed income markets are more responsive to the domestic macroeconomic announcements than equity markets. Lahaye et al.
(2011) also show that the propensity of macroeconomic surprises to create jumps differs across asset classes, i.e., exchange rates, bonds and stock index.
Size and sign of jumps associated with US macroeconomic announcements
In this section, we associate the direction and magnitude of jumps detected in all five markets with the type of macroeconomic announcements. Since we utilize the mean forecast for each macroeconomic announcement to calculate surprises, the magnitude and direction of jumps are related to the value and sign of the given surprise.
Appendix B reports the date and time of the jump, the market (product), the return computed as logarithm of the price ratio before and after the jump, the actual announcement along with its mean forecast value, and type of the news announced for each macroeconomic indicator causing a jump in European markets. We look at the direction of the jump based on news type, i.e., whether the surprise is a 'good news' or 'bad news'. An announcement is classified as 'good news' if the event is better than forecasted and as 'bad news' otherwise.
Our results show that most of the U.S macroeconomic events generally cause jumps in all markets in our sample. However, stock index futures clearly dominate the picture. Interestingly, the larger the surprise, the greater impact it has on all three
European stock index futures. For example, U.S unemployment rate announcement on 6 June and 5 September 2008, where the employment rate was 0.4 worse than expected, caused a large negative jump in all three equity index futures i.e., Euro S t o x x 5 0 , C A C 4 0 a n d D A X 3 0 . T h e r e i s a l s o a s t r o n g c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e directions of the surprises and signs of the jumps implying that most of the time, investors only base their trades on the forecasted numbers and take a long position in the index if the indicator is better than expected and short it after a bad news.
However, there are sometimes negative reactions to good news. One of the plausible reasons explaining this discrepancy is that there may be some other factors beyond macroeconomic announcements that can have a strong impact on the orientation of the jump. Secondly, as the mean forecast is not always a very good predictor of the market direction, the surprises may not serve as the true sentiment of the market.
10
10 Another possible explanation along the same line is that these forecasts are not unanimously adopted among all analysts and big financial institutions typically compile their own forecast. However, it is also important to note that whenever there is an opposite response to the type of announcement, all five index futures analyzed in this study always react uniformly to that particular news event.
Another interesting finding is that all three equity markets repeatedly react to the announced indicator in a similar fashion. European equity indices futures share 155 common jumps in response to the U.S macroeconomic news announcements.
US macro announcements and Cojumps in European markets
Insert Table 4 about here
The lower panel of Table 4 reports the probability of cojumps conditional on jumps in individual markets (P(coj|jump)). The conditional probability in the first column indicates that 71.92% of all jumps on Euro Stoxx50 (FESX) are also cojumps on DAX30 futures (FDAX). Similarly, 54.96% of all jumps on Euro Stoxx50 are cojumps on DAX30 and CAC futures, signifying a highly dependence structure of European equity markets.
Next, we examine the conditional probability of cojump for every significant US macroeconomic news announcement. The second panel of Table 5 shows the probability of a cojump on the considered markets given a jump on the market shown in the corresponding column, in response to consumer price index announcements (CPI Harju and Hussain (2011), Andersson (2010) and Hussain (2011) . Insert Figure 6 about here
Time series pattern of Jumps and cojumps
Discussion and Conclusion
Price discovery in financial markets is virtually a continuous process. We use a new jump detection measure built upon a methodology proposed by Andersen et al. (2007c) and Lee and Mykland (2008) . Our results show that scheduled US macroeconomic announcements cause significant jumps on all asset classes.
However, European equity markets are found to be more sensitive to the US fundamentals than other asset classes. Our results also indicate a strong correlation between the type of the news and orientation of the jumps. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of jumps have considerably increased in European markets since the global the start of the global credit crisis in 2007. We also find a strong evidence of cojumps caused by US macro surprises across European stock index futures, suggesting that the interdependence among European equity markets has increased since the global recession in 2007.
These results have important implications for finance practitioners and researchers.
Our results suggest that most of the time, investors base their trades only on the forecasted numbers and take a long position in the index if the indicator is better than expected and short it after a bad news. Our results also indicate that there are differences in markets' response to different types of announcements, thus linking the fundamental to different asset classes may allow us to develop hedging strategies suitable to a particular asset class. good news good news good news bad news bad news bad news good news bad news bad news bad news bad news Notes: This table reports the date and time of the jump, the market (product), the return computed as logarithm of the price ratio before and after the jump, actual announcement and its mean forecast value, and the type of the news announced for each macroeconomic indicator causing a jump in European markets. We look at the direction of the jump based on whether the surprise is a 'good news' or 'bad news'. An announcement is classified as 'good news' if the event is better than forecasted and as 'bad news' otherwise. FDAX, FESX, FCE are futures indices of German DAX, Euro Stoxx 50, and French CAC, respectively.
Appendix A
Appendix C1
Descriptive statistics on significant jumps before 2007.01.01 from 13:00 until 22:00 Nb. obs.) and the number of days in our sample (N. Days). The second panel shows the total number of jump day s (Nb . J umpd ay s ), i.e . d ay s w ith a t le as t o ne j ump) , t he p ro b ab ility (i n %) o f a j u mp d ay (P(jumpday)=100(Nb. jumpdays / Nb. Days)), and the number of jumps per jump day (E(nb. jumps|Nb.jumpdays). The third panel gives the total number jumps (Nb.jumps), their proportion (in %) over sample observations (P(jump) = 100(Nb.jumps/Nb.Obs.)), as well as their absolute mean size and standard deviation E(|jumpsize||jump) and Var(|jumpsize||jump)). The panel four and five split the jumps in two categories: positive and negative jumps. Proportions (P(jump > 0) and P(jump < 0)), mean (E(jumpsize|jump > 0) and E(jumpsize|jump < 0) ) and std. Nb. obs.) and the number of days in our sample (N. Days). The second panel shows the total number of jump day s (Nb . J umpd ay s ), i.e . d ay s w ith a t le as t o ne j ump) , t he p ro b ab ility (i n %) o f a j u mp d ay (P(jumpday)=100(Nb. jumpdays / Nb. Days)), and the number of jumps per jump day (E(nb. jumps|Nb.jumpdays). The third panel gives the total number jumps (Nb.jumps), their proportion (in %) over sample observations (P(jump) = 100(Nb.jumps/Nb.Obs.)), as well as their absolute mean size and standard deviation E(|jumpsize||jump) and Var(|jumpsize||jump)). The panel four and five split the jumps in two categories: positive and negative jumps. Proportions (P(jump > 0) and P(jump < 0)), mean (E(jumpsize|jump > 0) and E(jumpsize|jump < 0) ) and std. Nb. obs.) and the number of days in our sample (N. Days). The second panel shows the total number of jump day s (Nb . J umpd ay s ), i.e . d ay s w ith a t le as t o ne j ump) , t he p ro b ab ility (i n %) o f a j u mp d ay (P(jumpday)=100(Nb. jumpdays / Nb. Days)), and the number of jumps per jump day (E(nb. jumps|Nb.jumpdays). The third panel gives the total number of jumps (Nb.jumps), their proportion (in %) over sample observations (P(jump) = 100(Nb.jumps/Nb.Obs.)), as well as their absolute mean size and standard deviation E(|jumpsize||jump) and Var(|jumpsize||jump)). The panel four and five splits the jumps in two categories: positive and negative jumps. Proportions (P(jump > 0) and P(jump < 0)), mean (E(jumpsize|jump > 0) and E(jumpsize|jump < 0) ) and std. dev. (Var(jumpsize|jump>0) and Var(jumpsize|jump < 0)) are reported, as for the full set of jumps in absolute value. Finally, the last panel reports the percentage of jumps that are negative (100(Nb. jumps<0/Nb.jumps) and the associated standard error. 
